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One  of  the  most  enduring  questions  in  the  literature  on  the  economics  of 
technological change relates to the impact of patent protection.  Economists have hotly 
debated  the  extent  to  which  allowing  strong  patent  rights  spurs  or  detracts  from 
technological innovation.   
 
In recent years, a particular hotbed for these discussions has related to the impact 
of patents in emerging  industries.  A substantial literature on incomplete contracting, 
beginning with Grossman and Hart [1986] and Hart and Moore [1990], suggests that 
firms will be unwilling to invest when risks of expropriation are high.  A number of 
critics have charged that these problems are particularly intense in regard to patents: both 
academic  and  practitioners  have  asserted  that  the  poor  quality  of  patent  reviews  has 
created  a  “thicket”  of  overlapping  patent  holdings  that  make  these  expropriation 
problems  likely.    In  particular,  by  granting  large  number  of  property  rights  on small 
blocks of technology, patent office officials may make it difficult for firms to access the 
critical intellectual properties they need (see, for instance, Heller and Eisenberg [1998], 
Shapiro [2001], and Ziedonis [2004]).  As a result, firms will have reduced incentives to 
innovate. 
 
This paper examines these issues by studying the software industry.  Patents have 
been intensely controversial in this industry, largely for the reasons delineated above.   
The limited work to date that has made these arguments, especially Bessen and Hunt 
[2004],  is  frequently  cited  by  policymakers:  see,  for  instance,  the  2003  debate  about   2 
software patents in the European Parliament.  Other scholars, however, have disputed 
these claims (see, for example, Mann [2004]). But to date, the claims regarding impact of 
patenting  on  the  development  of  the  software  industry  have  received  little  empirical 
evaluation.  
 
This paper is related to earlier empirical works, which have largely focused on 
understanding  the  impacts  of  a  single  intellectual  property  policy  reform.    Examples 
include studies of the broadening of Japanese patent scope (Sakakibara and Branstetter 
[2001]), the establishment of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in the United 
States (Kortum and Lerner [1998], Hall and Ziedonis [2001]), and the strengthening of 
patent protection of pharmaceuticals in such nations as India (Lanjouw [1998]) and Italy 
(Scherer and Weisburst [1995]).  
 
Somewhat unlike these studies, however, we focus on a change that involved an 
alternative form of intellectual property protection: the reduction of software copyright 
protection  in  the  Lotus  v.  Borland  decision.    If  patent  and  copyright  protections  are 
substitutes, then the weakening of one form of protection should be associated with an 
increasing reliance on the other.
1  We rely on this methodology because there is no single 
event that unambiguously established the patentability of software, while this had the 
                                                 
1 The view that patents and copyrights are substitutes has emerged from a considerable number of legal and 
economic analyses of these questions that have been informed by practitioner discussions, including Menell 
[1989], Lemley and O' Brien [1997], and Mowery and Graham [2003]. It is still possible, however, that 
patents and copyrights are not substitutes. Therefore, their relationship is part of what we are testing when 
we examine empirically the impact of the judicial decisions concerning copyright on the level of patent 
filings. 
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clear earmarks of a shock to the system.  We examine if the increased reliance on patents 
after this decision led to a decrease in innovation for the reasons spelled out by the critics. 
 
In  this  analysis,  we  undertake  a  “differences-in-differences”  analysis.    We 
examine the subset of firms that were most effected by the decision in Lotus v. Borland 
as determined through an event study around the announcement of the judicial decision, 
which we subsequently  refer to as “interface firms.”
2  (The results are also robust to 
identifying the firms through a subjective classification of which firms were likely to be 
affected.)  We compare the shifts in the behavior of these firms with other software firms, 
which should have been less affected by the increased reliance of patenting. 
 
We find that the judicial decision appears to have had a considerable impact on 
patenting.    The  number  of  patent  applications  filed  appears  to  have  increased  more 
dramatically for the interface firms than the others. But little evidence can be found for 
any  harmful  effects  from  this  policy  shift.  In  fact,  the  increased  reliance  on  patent 
protection appears to be correlated with significant growth in a number of performance 
measures such as sales levels.  
 
This finding must, of course, be interpreted with caution.  Our division between 
the affected and unaffected firms is somewhat crude.  The environment is a complex one: 
many other changes, such as the widespread dissemination of the Internet, may have 
                                                 
2  The Lotus v. Borland case concerns the copyrightability of software interfaces. Therefore, we expect that 
the firms most affected by the judicial decisions develop software in which interfaces are the key elements.    4 
differentially affected firms during this period.   Finally, the affects of the patent thicket 
problems may take longer to be felt than examined here.   
 
The outline of this paper is as follows.  Section 2 briefly reviews the history of 
intellectual property protection in the U.S. software industry.  Section 3 described the 
construction of the dataset.  Section 4 presents the analysis.  The final section concludes 
the paper. 
 
2.  Intellectual Property Protection of Software in the United States 
The  USPTO  traditionally  was  reluctant  to  grant  patents  on  computer  software 
inventions. Through the 1970s, the Office resisted granting such patents on the grounds 
that computer programs were mathematical algorithms, and not in the categories allowed 
by Section 101 of the U.S. Patent Act:  processes, machines, articles of manufacture, and 
compositions of matter.  
 
The USPTO changed its position after a series of U.S. Supreme Court decisions. 
In the 1981 case Diamond v. Diehr, the Court ordered the USPTO to grant a patent on an 
invention involving computer software that determining how rubber should be heated as 
part of the curing process. The Court stated that because the invention was not merely a 
mathematical algorithm, but also included steps for processing the rubber, the patent was 
valid.  
   5 
This decision, and the ones by the Supreme Court that followed (such as Diamond 
v. Bradley, 1981), led to considerable confusion.  Despite the best efforts of lower courts 
to clarify the decisions, patentees struggled to determine when an invention was merely a 
mathematical  algorithm,  and  when  it  was  in  fact  a  patentable  invention  that  simply 
contained a mathematical algorithm.  
 
In  1995,  the  USPTO  decided  it  was  time  to  develop  guidelines  for  patent 
examiners  that  reflect  these  recent  court  decisions.  In  its  Final  Computer  Related 
Examination Guidelines, it opened the door to the patentability of most software related 
inventions are now statutory under these guidelines.  In particular, it created "safe harbor" 
exemptions for inventions having "significant post solution activity", meaning that the 
software program is used to control something external to the software program, or "pre-
computer  process  activity",  meaning  software  programs  that  manipulate  numbers 
representing concrete, real world values.  Also, software can be patented if it is claimed 
in connection with a specific machine or product, including such diverse inventions as a 
graphics  program,  a  spreadsheet,  and  a  word  processing  program.    Many  observers 
suggested that these guidelines only codified a change that had already been already put 
into practice. 
 
Meanwhile, the feasibility of copyrights on computer software had been first been 
suggested  by  the  major  reform  of  the  copyright  system  in  1976.    The  act  had  left 
ambiguous,  however,  many  of  the  details  about  such  protection.    Through  the  1980   6 
amendment to the  copyright  act, Congress finally  gave  a statutory basis to copyright 
protection for software, but important ambiguities still remained.   
 
The most important of these related to the scope of copyright protection.  The 
courts had long recognized a distinction between copyrights, which protects expression, 
and  patents,  which  protect  useful  procedures  or  machines.    To  what  extent  did  the 
protection for software extend beyond the actual code? 
 
Three decisions in the ensuing dozen years highlighted this confusion.  In the 
1986  case,  Whelan  v.  Jaslow,  concerned  a  dental  laboratory  management  software 
system, which a dentist had hired a programmer to write for his minicomputer in the EDL 
language.    After  a  few  years,  the  programmer  wrote  a  similar  program  for  personal 
computers in BASIC.  The dentist sued for copyright infringement, even through the new 
program was in a different language and differed in some respects.  The court, pointing to 
the  similar  interfaces  used  by  the  new  program,  argued  that  it  was  too  close  to  the 
original program, and thus violated its copyright.  
 
In the 1990 case, Lotus v. Paperback Software and Mosaic Software, the curt 
again decided in favor of a plaintiff in an infringement case.  Paperback and Mosaic had 
both came out with spreadsheet pro grams that displayed extreme similarities to Lotus' s 
1-2-3. In the decision, the court basically determined that a company has the right to 
copyright the "look and feel" of its user interface.  
   7 
The  logic  in  these  decisions  was  sharply  criticized  in  the  1991  decision  in 
Computer Associates v. Altai.  In this decision, the court found in favor of the alleged 
copyright  infringer,  referring  to  the  precedent  in  the  earlier  cases  as  "inadequate  and 
inaccurate." In particular, the judge cast doubt on the proposition that the structure of the 
program or its interfaces could be used to determine whether a program was infringing. 
 
It was against this backdrop that the case between Lotus and Borland was heard. 
Lotus argued that Borland had copied key aspects of its 1-2-3 spreadsheet for the Quattro 
programs, including menu commands and structure, long prompts, keystroke sequences, 
and  macro  language.    At  the  district  level,  the  court  in  July  1992  made  a  summary 
judgment ruling for Lotus, arguing the Quattro program was similar enough to infringe 
on the copyright for the 1-2-3 interface.  Borland appealed to the appellate court for the 
first circuit, which in March 1995 reversed the decision, holding “that the Lotus menu 
command hierarchy is uncopyrightable subject matter,” because it was little more than a 
“method of operation.”  Ten months later, this decision was upheld by an equally divided 
Supreme Court.  While the split in the court meant that the decision did not bind beyond 
the  first  circuit,  the  decisions  attracted  a  great  of  protection  and  were  perceived  as 
signaling a sharp limitation of the scope of copyright protection. 
 
Thus, the treatment of patenting software changed only gradually over this period.  
It seems hard to identify a single event or shock that shifted perceptions.  The value of 
copyrights for protecting software, however, was dramatically revised downward as a 
means of protecting computer interfaces after the Lotus v. Borland decision.  If these two   8 
forms of intellectual property protection were substitutes, the affected firms should have 
increasingly relied on patent protection after the decision.   
 
Although the Computer Associates v. Altai ruling in 1991 might have influenced 
the affected firms’ patenting behaviors, its effect was compounded by the 1992 Lotus v. 
Borland ruling by the district court, in which the Lotus 1-2-3 interface was determined to 
be copyrightable.  The district court ruling also implies that the Altai ruling did not set 
much of a precedent for copyrightability of software interfaces. It was the 1996 Supreme 
Court  ruling  of  the  Lotus  v.  Borland  case  that  made  the  copyrightability  of  software 
interfaces abundantly clear. As the 1996 ruling had the clear earmarks of a shock to the 
system, our analysis below will focus on this policy shift. 
 
3.  The Data 
The primary data for the LECG software database, which this analysis employs, 
was purchased from Corporate Technology Information Services (CorpTech). This data 
was supplemented with variables from Compustat, the Center for Research into Securities 
Prices (CRSP) database, Venture Economics’ VentureXpert (formerly known as Venture 
Intelligence) Database, and the USPTO’s Patent database.  
 
CorpTech was founded in 1986 to prepare an annual directory and customized 
databases for high technology firms in the United States. In 2000, it was acquired by 
OneSource,  and  has  been  its  subsidiary  since  then.  CorpTech  is  a  unique  source  of 
information available on 50,000 U.S. high technology manufacturing companies in 18   9 
industries. Its data covers public and private companies (information that is not accessible 
through  any  other  sources)  and  includes  large  companies,  new  companies,  emerging 
companies, and subsidiaries and operating units of U.S. and foreign companies.
3  
 
In  all,  we  have  51,420  observations  on  15,207  software  companies  for  1990-
2002.
4  The data are available every other year for even years: 1990, 1992, 1994, 1996, 
1998, 2000 and 2002.  Approximately 12% of our sample are firms that were publicly 
traded companies for all or some of the sample period. For these firms, we have added 
CUSIPs, allowing the data to be matched to Compustat and CRSP data.  We encountered 
a  few  issues  while  adding  CUSIP  information  to  public  companies.  First,  many 
companies  in  our  dataset  are  subsidiaries.  We  added  CUSIP  information  of  a  parent 
company  for  such  companies.  All  information  merged  by  CUSIP  variable,  such  as 
Compustat data, reflects the parent company’s information. Second, we could not locate 
CUSIP information for about 12 percent of all public companies in our dataset—some 
companies  had  ceased  their  operations,  some  companies  became  private,  and  others 
simply could not be located. Note that some of the firms that report themselves as public 
in CorpTech are traded on the pink sheets or overseas, and thus are not picked up by 
Compustat and CRSP. 
 
                                                 
3 See CorpTech website at  < http://www.corptech.com/business-information/methodology.php>. 
4 We define software companies as those that have at least one detailed product classification beginning 
with “SOF.” That is, to be included in our dataset, the firm had to consider software development as an 
intentional  part  of  its  business,  thus  listing  the  category  of  software  it  develops  when  interviewed  by 
CorpTech.  This  definition  excludes  some  firms  that  patent  software  but  do  not  consider  themselves 
software companies, such as Hewlett Packard. Subsidiaries of Hewlett Packard (and other such companies) 
are included if they listed at least one software development category (“SOF”).   10 
From  patent  data  purchased  from  the  U.S.  Patent  and  Trademark  Office,  we 
identified  all  software  patents.  We  included  all  patents  classified  under  International 
Classification  (IPC)  G06F  and  granted  between  1976  and  2000––a  total  of  76,920 
patents. We merged these files using the name and location of the assignee in the USPTO 
database, as well as the subject of the award.  In total we obtained 24,006 patent-to-
company  matches.    The  unmatched  patents  were  largely  awarded  to  individuals  and 
foreign corporations. 
 
The process of matching the VentureXpert data proceeded similarly, exploiting 
the  detailed  name,  location  and  business  line  information  compiled  by  Venture 
Economics.  
 
Table  1  summarizes  the  sample  along  several  key  dimensions  of  firm 
performance.  The number of patent filings is that in the current and previous year—e.g., 
for 2000, the tabulation includes filings made in 1999 and 2000—while for the other 
measures, the revenues and the employment at the end of the year are tabulated.  The 
compilation of successful patent applications only includes patents awarded as of mid-
2003.  Thus, the compilation for 2000 is sharply lower than the others, not because fewer 
flings had been made, but because few of those filed in this period had yet issued.  Little 
time trend is apparent: this reflects the fact that while many of the established firms grew 
rapidly over this period, there was also considerably entry of small new firms. 
 
4.  The Analysis   11 
We now proceed to analyze the patterns seen in the data.  We first discuss the way 
in which we classify the observations into the group that are and are not likely to be 
affected  by  the  Lotus  v.  Borland  decision.    We  then  present  the  results  regarding 
patenting and other indicators of firm success.  Finally, we discuss the robustness of the 
results. 
 
A.  Classifying the Firms 
A central challenge here is to separate the firms into those likely to be affected by 
the copyright decision and not.  There was no one, obvious approach to addressing this 
issue.  We thus took a variety of approaches. 
 
Our preferred approach was the most objective: to look at the types of firms most 
affected  by  these  decisions.    To implement  this,  we  looked  at  the  subset  of  publicly 
traded  software  firms  around  the  time  of  the  three  judicial  decisions  in  the  Lotus  v. 
Borland case.
5  We estimated an event study, where one observation was used for each 
firm and each judicial decision.  The dependent variable was the actual return of the firm 
in a window around the event. As independent variables, we employ dummy variables 
denoting the 359 distinct technology classes into which the firms were sorted, as well as 
dummy variables for each observation date.  The industry dummy variables are coded as 
one if the firm was assigned to that class based on the 1994 classification scheme when 
                                                 
5 The three judicial decisions are: 1) on July 31, 1992, the district court ruled that the Lotus menu command 
hierarchy was copyrightable expression and Borland had illegally copied large parts of the Lotus 1-2-3 
command structure; 2) on March 9, 1995, the 1st US Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the 1992 ruling and 
determined  that  Lotus'   menu  structures,  incorporated  into  Borland' s  Quatro  Pro  spreadsheet,  are  "an 
uncopyrightable method of operation"; and  3) on January 16, 1996 the Supreme Court upholds the ruling, 
thus affirming the decision by the appeal court.  
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such scheme is recorded by Corptech or the classification scheme in the closest year to 
1994.    
 
We alternatively use the absolute return of the firm and the actual return as a 
dependent variable.  In the case of the actual return, as the decision on the district level 
was favorable to copyright holders, we negate the actual return in the window around that 
event.  If  we  wish  to  identify  the  firms  most  adversely  affected  by  the  decisions,  we 
should look at the ones who have the most persistently negative reaction.  These should 
be the firms that relied most heavily on copyright protection.  But this view is a little 
problematic:  after  all,  our  dataset  contains  both  copyright  holders  and  copyright 
infringers.  A judicial decision that is unfavorable to one group would be favorable to the 
other. A better approach is to examine the absolute returns.  The firms that moved the 
most in response to the decisions, whether in a positive or negative manner, may be the 
most appropriate ones to employ. 
 
We use different event windows to reflect possible delays in incorporating the 
information into the stock price.  While the judicial decisions have a clear timing, there 
may be lags associated with understanding the implications of the decisions for particular 
firms.  We thus use windows from one day before to one day after up to three days before 
to three days after.   
 
We  then  examine  the  coefficients  on  the  technology  classes  based  on  the 
regressions.  If the coefficient takes on the expected sign and is significant at the .2 level   13 
in a two-sided, we define this as a “strongly” affected class.  If the coefficient takes on 
the expected sign but is significant at a lower level, we define this as a “medium” class.  
Otherwise,  we  regard  it  as  unaffected.    We  then  assign  all  firms—whether  public  or 
private—in the strong class or alternatively in the strong and medium class to be the ones 
we anticipate being affected by the decision. 
 
An alternative approach is to rely on industry knowledge to classify the firms.  
We also undertake an a priori classification, assigning firms in a variety of technology 
classes to be likely to be affected by the decision.  These are categories where we believe 
interfaces to be particularly important: accounting, banking, education, file management, 
financial analysis, health services, and insurance. 
 
Table 2 summarizes the different classification schemes employed.  It indicates 
for each approach the number of firms assigned to the strong and medium groups.  We 
also compare the distribution to that in the scheme we ultimately relied on for the base 
analysis: using the absolute returns and the window from two days before to two days 
after the decision.  One encouraging aspect is the considerable degree of overlap across 
the  different  schemes:  in  each  case,  including  our  a  priori  classification,  we  are 
disproportionately  choosing  the  same  firms  as  the  affected  ones.  In  the  following 
analysis, we consider those firms who are assigned to the strong or median groups as 
interface firms.  
          
B.  Impact on Patenting and  Firm Growth   14 
We now proceed to understand the impact of the shift on patenting and measures 
of firm performance.  The patenting analysis can be understood as a validation exercise 
for our selection process.  If there is no increase in relative number patent applications 
filed for the group presumably affected by the Lotus v. Borland decision, we must worry 
that our identification of these firms is problematic or that our claim that patents and 
copyrights are substitutes is problematic. We then focus on firm performance.  If the 
arguments outlined in the introduction are valid, we should see detrimental effects from 
the increasing reliance on patent protection. 
 
Figure 1 displays the basic pattern regard to patenting.  The number of patent 
applications filed by interface firms exceeds that by non-interface firms after 1992. In 
particular, beginning with 1995-96 there seems to be a substantial increase in the rate of 
patenting. 
 
Table  3  presents  similar  before  and  after  data  for  seven  indicators  of  firm 
performance: sales, total assets, market capitalization, the number of employees, sales per 
employee, R&D expenditure and the number of product lines.  In the case of sales and 
employees, as well as the ratio, we have data on the majority of the firms in the CorpTech 
database.  In the case of the others, we have data only for the much smaller subset of 
firms that are in Compustat.  The table presents the mean, median and standard deviation 
of each performance indicator for interface firms and non-interface firms respectively. 
We  observe  that  the  growth  rate  for  interface  firms  is  greater  than  the  one  for  non-
interface firms in several cases such as sales in 1996 and 1998, and number of employees   15 
in  1996.  Interestingly,  interface  firms  have  been  expanding  their  product  lines  more 
rapidly than non-interface firms in all even years between 1990 and 1998. 
 
We then turn to examining these patterns in a regression framework.  We first 
examine  the  impact  of  the  Lotus  v.  Borland  ruling  on  patenting.  We  undertake  a 
“difference-in-difference”  approach  to  compare  the  differences  in  patenting  activities 
before and after the policy shift for those affected and those not. Table 4 presents the 
results  from  three  different  regression  specifications:  Poisson,  OLS  and  Negative 
Binomial.  For the Poisson and Negative Binomial specifications, the number of patents 
filed in the current and previous year is used as the dependent variable. For the OLS 
specification, the natural logarithm of (the number of patents filed in the current and 
previous year + 1) is used as the dependent variable. Year dummies, the dummy for 
interface firm and the interaction terms between interface firm and year dummies are 
used as explanatory variables.  
 
As  the  observed  difference  in  patenting  activities  may  result  from  underlying 
shifts in firm-level or industry-level characteristics rather than the policy shift, we need to 
control for these characteristics. We thus include firm-level controls such as the age of 
the firm, lagged value of the sales and the lagged total number of patents filed. 
6  
 
Entry  rate  in  each  technology  class  is  also  used  to  control  for  industry-level 
competition, as firms may rely more heavily on patents to gain competitive advantages as 
                                                 
6 In all our regression analyses, lagged values for year t are referring to the values in year t-2 (reflecting the 
fact we have observations on a biannual basis). 
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the industry becomes more competitive. The entry rate is calculated as the ratio between 
the number of new entries in a technology class and the total number of firms in that class. 
For firms that have multiple lines of business, we use the average of the entry rate in each 
technology class that the firms have been sorted into. It is possible that some firms in a 
technology class are not recorded by CorpTech. Those firms are most likely small ones 
so that they were not on CorpTech’s radar screen. Thus the presence of those firms would 
not have a large impact on the competitive environment.  
 
As we do not have any observations before year 1990, we are not able to compute 
the entry rates in year 1990.  Therefore, in our analysis we exclude year 1990. Also as our 
dataset  only  contains  very  few  patent  applications  filed  between  1999  and  2000,  we 
exclude year 2000 in our analysis.
7 
 
The results in Table 4 are consistent with the hypothesis that the reduction in the 
copyright protection leads to more patenting, as evidenced by the significantly positive 
coefficients for the interaction terms between the interface dummy and year dummies.  
Our results also indicate several things. First, given everything else equal, interface firms 
tend to file fewer patents than non-interface  firms on average. Second, firms tend to 
patent  more  if  they  have  filed  many  patent  applications  in  the  past.  Finally,  a  more 
competitive environment tends to motivate firms to file more patent applications. 
 
                                                 
7 In addition, we are concerned that the State Street case (resolved by the Supreme Court in 1999) may 
have increased the number of financial patents and thus made the regression results difficult to interpret. 
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We  now  proceed  to  examine  the  impact  of  patenting  activities  on  firms’ 
performance. The correlation between a firm’s patenting activity and its performance is 
difficult to examine directly as both of them may be caused by third factors such as the 
size of the firm. The Lotus v. Borland decision presents an exogenous shock and thus 
enables us to employ the instrumental estimator to address this endogeneity problem.  
Table 5 reports the results. The regressions presented in Table 4 are used as the first stage. 
In the second stage, we use the predicted number of patents from the first stage as an 
instrumented variable.  In Table 5, the predicted number of patents is derived from the 
full-model Poisson specification in Table 4.  
 
For dependent variables, we use the growth rates of seven measures:  sales, total 
asset,  market  capitalizations,  employment,  sales  per  employee,  R&D  expenditure  and 
number of lines of business. As above, each observation of a firm at a two-year interval is 
used as an independent observation.  
 
We first estimate the growth measures without using the patenting variable. The 
idea here is to examine whether firms in sectors with more generous patent policies grow 
more  rapidly,  regardless  of  their  specific  patenting  activity.  Then  we  add  the  lagged 
predicted  number  of  patents  and  its  interaction  with  interface  and  year  dummies  to 
examine to what extent the difference in their patenting activity affects their financial 
performance.  As  control  variables,  we  first  employ  the  lagged  value  of  each  growth 
measure: for instance, the level of sales at the beginning of the two-year interval if the 
growth rate of sales is used as the dependent variable.  We also include entry rate and the   18 
age of the firm. An OLS specification is used for all regressions. We then repeat the 
above procedures for the inception of venture financing. A probit model is employed here.  
 
As reported in Table 5, we find little evidence that more generous or restrictive 
patent policies significantly affect the growth rates of the firms: in almost all regressions 
without the predicted patenting variable, no significant differences between interface and 
non-interface  firms  are  detected.  Only  in  the  cases  of  sales  growth  in  1996  and 
employment growth in 1998, we observe significant declines for interface firms. We do 
not have a ready explanation for these declines. The result for product line expansion is 
consistent with our early observation that interface firms in general are more active in 
expanding their business lines.  
 
Once we control for firm patenting behavior, we find no evidence for any harmful 
effects  from  the  judicial  decision:  none  of  the growth  measures  and  the  inception  of 
venture financing seem negatively affected by this policy shift. In fact, we find that the 
increased reliance on patent protection is correlated with significant growth in sales and 
business lines in 1996 and 1998, and number of employees, market capitalization and 
sales per employee in 1998. We also note that the increased reliance on patenting did not 
appear to lead to any decrease in innovation, as evidenced by the regression result where 
R&D growth is used as the dependent variable.  
 
C.  Exploring Robustness   19 
A natural concern is whether the results above or are a consequence of the way in 
which the firms were identified or of confounding event.  We thus repeat the analysis in 
several ways to explore the robustness of the finding. 
 
Table 6 summarizes one of these robustness analyses.  Rather than relying on a 
single definition of what constitutes firms likely to be affected by the Lotus v. Borland 
decision, we rely on alternative rules to identify these firms.  In particular, as in Table 2, 
we  rely  on  different  event  windows  and  relative  rather  than  absolute  returns  for 
identifying affected firms.  The table replicates some the analyses reported in Table 4, 
showing that the same patterns appear with the alternative definitions.  In unreported 
regressions, we show that using the other alternative definitions in Table 2 have little 
impact on the patenting results, and that the results replicating the analyses in Table 5 are 
similar. 
 
In our analysis, a firm is considered as an interface firm if it has one or more 
business lines in the affected group. This scheme would include firms as interface firms 
even if they only have a small portion of business lines in the affected group. In an 
unreported analysis, we repeat our analyses in Table 4 and 5 using a new classification 
scheme in which a firm is considered affected only if it has more than 50 percent of its 
business lines in the affected group. We compared these firms to the ones that have no 
business lines in the affected group. The results are similar to those in Tables 4 and 5.  
   20 
We were also concerned about different user groups these software firms target.  
In particular, software firms can develop software for enterprises or home users. The 
policy  shift  may  affect  these  two  groups  differently  if  one  group  cares  more  about 
intellectual property protection than the other. To address this concern, we repeat the 
analyses, after eliminating all firms whose products run on mainframe computers. The 
results are similar except that when we replicate the analysis in Table 4, the coefficients 
of the interaction terms, (interface * year 1996) and (interface * year 1998), more than 
double  in  all  specifications.  This  suggests  that  firms  targeting  at  enterprises  are  less 
responsive to the judicial decision, possibly due to the fact that interface design is not the 
most important element of their products and they are less affected by the policy shift as a 
result. 
 
Our fourth concern was whether the results were shaped by confounding events. 
In particular, was there an event that may have affected interface firms different from 
other corporations? We explore the most visible candidate: the widespread diffusion of 
access to the World Wide Web in the mid-1990s. While it is not obvious that interface 
firms would be more affected, this possibility is worrisome. To address this concern, we 
repeat  the  analyses  in  Tables  4  and  5,  now  eliminating  all  firms  geared  towards  the 
Internet (we identify these by eliminating firms that develops products based on Web 
browsers or have Java as a key software platform.) We obtain similar results.  
 
5.  Conclusions   21 
The  growth  of  software  patenting  has  triggered  numerous  concerns  among 
academics,  practitioners  and  policymakers.    In  particular,  the  diversity  of  the  patent 
holdings in this area, and the alleged failure of the patent awards to always reward true 
innovators, have led to concerns of expropriation problems for innovators.  These claims, 
however, have been little scrutinized empirically. 
 
In this paper, we focus on the reduction of software copyright protection in the 
Lotus v. Borland decision.  If patent and copyright protections are substitutes, then the 
weakening of one form of protection should be associated with an increasing reliance on 
the  other.    We  rely  on  this  methodology  because  there  is  no  single  event  that 
unambiguously  established  the  patentability  of  software,  while  this  had  the  clear 
earmarks of a shock to the system. 
 
We examine the subset of firms that were most affected by the decision in Lotus 
v.  Borland,  as  determined  through  an  event  study  around  the  announcement  of  the 
judicial  decision,  and  compare  the  shifts  in  the  behavior  of  these  firms  with  other 
software firms, which should have been less affected by the decreased effectiveness of 
copyright.  We find that the judicial decision appears to have had a considerable impact 
on patenting.  The number of patent applications filed appears to have increased more 
dramatically for the interface firms than the others.  But little evidence can be found for 
any  harmful  effects  from  this  policy  shift.  In  fact,  the  increased  reliance  on  patent 
protection appears to be correlated with significant growth in a number of performance 
measures  such  as  the  level  of  sales.  While  our  interpretation  must  be  cautious,  we   22 
conclude  there  is  little  evidence  of  harm  from  the  increased  reliance  on  software 
patenting.   23 
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Figure 1 
 
Patenting behaviors by interface firms and non-interface firms. We compute the average 
number of patents filed by interface and non-interface firms each year. Note that as we only 
consider even years between 1990 and 2000, the number of patents filed in year t is the sum of 
patents filed in year t and year t-1. The number of patent applications filed in year 2000 is very 
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Table 1 
 
Some characteristics of the sample. Panel A reports summary statistics for the number of 
patents filed by year. Panel B reports sales statistics by year. Panel C reports summary statistics 
for the number of employees in each firm by year.  
 
Panel A: Number of Patent Applications Filed by Each Firm in This and 
Previous Year 
Year  Mean  Std. Deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
1990  .64  14.98  0  556 
1992  1.17  27.79  0  962 
1994  1.34  31.97  0  1192 
1996  2.78  63.66  0  2165 
1998  2.12  5.99  0  1885 
2000  .04  .94  0  34 
Total  1.29  38.61  0  2165 
         
Panel B: Sales in Year (Million dollars) 
Year  Mean  Std. Deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
1990  133.62  2496.52  0  89583.3 
1992  123.96  2618.94  0  86846.68 
1994  81.36  1757.36  0  94083.89 
1996  110.59  1942.37  0  89515.8 
1998  115.77  1140.54  0  50954.43 
2000  98.66  1508.38  -.34  87500 
Total  104.50  1841.86  -.34  94083.89 
         
Panel C: Number of Employees in Each Firm at End of Year 
Year  Mean  Std. Deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
1990  217.14  3789.06  1  127927 
1992  346.66  6988.45  1  317100 
1994  161.50  1266.30  1  50000 
1996  215.62  4623.19  1  295000 
1998  265.68  2997.68  1  121000 
2000  406.24  5167.87  1  307401 
Total  297.312  4543.98  1  317100 
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Table 2 
 
Comparisons between the interface definition used in our analysis and alternative definitions. We looked at the subset of publicly traded 
software firms around the time of the three judicial decisions in the Lotus v. Borland case.  We estimated an event study, where one 
observation was used for each firm and judicial decision.  The dependent variable was the actual return of the firm in a window around 
the event. As dependent variables, we employ dummy variables denoting the 359 distinct technology classes into which the firms were 
sorted, as well as dummy variables for each observation date.  The industry dummy variables are coded as one if the firm was 
assigned to that class based on the 1994 classification scheme when such scheme is recorded by Corptech or the classification scheme 
in the closest year to 1994.  We then examine the coefficients on the technology classes based on the regressions. Panel A summarizes 
our  scheme  for  defining  strong,  median  and  no  response  groups.    Panel  B  indicates  for  each  approach,  including  our  a  priori 
classification, the number of firms assigned to the strong and medium groups. We also compare the distribution to that in the scheme 





Dependent variable  Strong  Median  No Response 
Percentage changes in the stock 
price
*** 
Coefficient is negative and p-
value < .2 
Coefficient is negative and .2￿ p-
value ￿ .8  
All codes that are not classified 
into strong or median group 
Absolute percentage changes in 
the stock price 
Coefficient is positive and p-value 
< .2 
Coefficient is positive and .2￿ p-
value ￿ .8 
All codes that are not classified 
into strong or median group 
 
                                                 
*** The ruling by the district court was in favor of Lotus. To be consistent, we negate the relative return during the first judicial decision in the pooled OLS 
regression. If we wish to identify the firms most adversely affected by the decisions, we should look at the ones who have the most persistently negative reaction.   28 
Panel B 
 
Event Window (t-1, t+1) 
Percentage Changes  Absolute Percentage Changes 





Median  No Response 
Number of Codes 
from regression 
analysis 
91  268  91  268 
Number of Codes 
included in our 
selection 
35  51  55  31 
Percentage Selected  .38  .19  .60  .12   
Event Window (t-2, t+2) 
Percentage Changes  Absolute Percentage Changes 





Median  No Response 
Number of Codes 
from regression 
analysis 
87  272  86  273 
Number of Codes 
included in our 
selection 
38  48  86  0 
Percentage Selected  .44  .18  1  0   
 
Event Window (t-3, t+3) 
Percentage Changes  Absolute Percentage Changes 





Median  No Response 
Number of Codes 
from regression 
analysis 
43  316  111  248 
Number of Codes 
included in our 
selection 
17  69  57  29 
Percentage Selected  .40  .22  .51  .11   
Our a priori Classification 
  Strong / Median  No Response 
Number of Codes from our a 
priori scheme  51  308 
Number of Codes included 
in our selection  16  70 
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Table 3 
 
Summary statistics for variables we use to measure firms’ performance. We use a number of 
ways to measure firms’ performance such as percentage growth in sales, total assets, market 
capitalization, the number of employees, sales per employee, R&D expenditure and the number 
of product lines. In Panel A to G, we report the means, medians, standard deviations of these 
measures for interface firms and non-interface firms respectively. An asterisk after a year number 
indicates that the value of interface firms is significantly greater than that of non-interface firms 
in that year with 90 percent confidence level by a one-tail t-test.  
 
Panel A: Growth in Sales 
Interface Firms  Non-interface Firms  Year 
Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  Mean  Median  Std. Dev. 
1990  2.49  -0.37  8.40  0.81  -0.67  3.23 
1992  0.69  -0.03  7.25  2.14  -0.03  23.81 
1994  0.67  -0.06  7.80  0.29  -0.06  1.58 
1996*  1.03  -0.06  10.49  0.40  -0.06  1.43 
1998*  1.43  -0.08  13.45  0.49  -0.08  3.24 
2000  0.59  -0.08  6.37  0.68  -0.08  8.40 
 
Panel B: Growth in Total Asset 
Interface Firms  Non-interface Firms  Year 
Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  Mean  Median  Std. Dev. 
1990             
1992  0.33  0.05  0.85  0.44  0.10  0.87 
1994  0.74  0.16  3.37  0.59  0.15  1.54 
1996  1.70  0.25  9.91  0.99  0.29  2.96 
1998  1.11  0.16  7.23  0.61  0.16  1.54 
2000  2.76  0.04  14.28  1.81  0.17  9.31 
 
Panel C: Growth in Market Capitalization 
Interface Firms  Non-interface Firms  Year 
Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  Mean  Median  Std. Dev. 
1990             
1992  0.86  0.14  2.23  1.53  0.44  3.15 
1994  0.48  0.11  1.37  0.42  0.19  0.88 
1996  2.05  0.41  8.80  1.07  0.55  2.03 
1998  1.60  0.00  19.31  0.39  0.00  1.28 
2000  1.33  0.00  8.97  2.23  0.00  25.71 
 
Panel D: Growth in Number of Employees 
Interface Firms  Non-interface Firms  Year 
Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  Mean  Median  Std. Dev. 
1990  0.67  -0.25  3.63  0.50  -0.53  2.34 
1992  0.42  0.00  3.86  0.18  0.00  0.61 
1994  0.50  0.00  7.17  0.36  0.00  2.00 
1996*  0.59  0.00  5.10  0.25  0.00  0.96 
1998  0.56  0.00  6.62  0.62  0.00  6.49 
2000  0.52  0.00  4.70  0.66  0.00  8.64 
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Panel E: Growth in Sales Per Employee 
Interface Firms  Non-interface Firms  Year 
Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  Mean  Median  Std. Dev. 
1990  0.29  0.26  0.54  1.59  -0.03  3.23 
1992  0.25  -0.03  1.75  0.36  -0.03  1.22 
1994*  0.40  -0.06  3.11  0.14  -0.06  1.07 
1996  0.26  -0.06  1.87  0.25  -0.06  1.36 
1998  0.33  -0.08  4.04  0.15  -0.08  1.44 
2000  -0.01  -0.13  0.77  -0.06  -0.16  0.66 
 
Panel F: Growth in R&D Expenditure 
Interface Firms  Non-interface Firms  Year 
Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  Mean  Median  Std. Dev. 
1990*  0.34  0.34  0.46  0.20  0.15  0.34 
1992  0.48  0.10  2.47  0.34  0.18  0.73 
1994  0.33  0.17  0.63  0.49  0.15  1.47 
1996  0.72  0.26  2.14  0.58  0.29  1.09 
1998  0.38  0.15  1.35  0.32  0.12  0.80 
2000  0.57  0.19  2.12  0.66  0.23  1.32 
 
Panel G: Growth in the Number of Product Lines 
Interface Firms  Non-interface Firms  Year 
Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  Mean  Median  Std. Dev. 
1990*  1.81  0.33  6.28  -0.35  -0.46  0.47 
1992*  0.54  0.00  1.46  0.10  0.00  0.59 
1994*  0.19  0.00  1.02  0.01  0.00  0.43 
1996*  0.28  0.00  1.34  0.01  0.00  0.40 
1998*  0.23  0.00  1.03  0.00  0.00  0.35 
2000*  0.18  0.00  1.07  -0.01  0.00  0.35 
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Table 4 
 
Regression analysis of the patenting behaviors of interface firms before and after the Lotus 
v.  Borland  lawsuit.  The  sample  consists  of  biannual  observations  of  15,207  software  firms 
between 1992 and 1998. We use a number of specifications including OLS, negative binomial 
and Poisson. The first row indicates the particular type of specification used. The number of 
patents filed each year is used as the dependent variable in all regressions. Entry rate is defined as 
the  percentage  of  new  entries  in  a  technology  class  and  is  used  to  control  for  industry 
competition. Lagged total number of patents applied is the total number of patents filed by a firm 
in the past and is used as a way to include fixed effects in the regressions. Heteroskedastic-
adjusted standard errors in parentheses.
10 
 






-1.069  -.991  -1.119  -.023  .124  -.752  -.714  interface 
[.034]***  [.033]***  [.034]***  [.010]**  [.794]  [.389]*  [.403]* 
3.869  2.329  2.712  .029  3.917  .981  1.006  interface * 
year 1996  [.075]***  [.078]***  [.082]***  [.015]**  [.960]***  [.551]*  [.562]* 
2.148  1.505  1.695  .031  1.134  1.329  1.221  interface * 
year 1998  [.055]***  [.049]***  [.051]***  [.014]**  [1.032]  [.565]**  [.580]** 
-1.546  -1.508  -1.494  .002  -2.393  .591  .837  Year 1994 
[.039]***  [.039]***  [.040]***  [.009]  [.624]***  [.373]  [.393]** 
-2.484  -2.559  -2.850  -.010  -3.184  .783  .794  Year 1996 
[.071]***  [.070]***  [.074]***  [.014]  [.784]***  [.499]  [.516] 
-1.860  -1.194  -1.199  -.013  -1.690  -.174  .248  Year 1998 
[.049]***  [.041]***  [.045]***  [.013]  [.837]**  [.512]  [.546] 
-.021  .011  .007  .001  -.000  -.022  -.016  Age of the 
firm  [.001]***  [.001]***  [.001]***  [.000]**  [.010]  [.010]**  [.010] 
.076  .050  .060  .023  4.501  3.176  3.381  Lagged 
value of 
sales  [.001]***  [.001]***  [.001]***  [.001]***  [1.351]***  [.548]***  [.569]*** 




  [.000]***  [.000]***  [.000]***    [.022]***  [.021]*** 
-1.324    1.392  .036  .639    2.914  Entry rate 
[.090]***    [.097]***  [.030]  [2.161]    [1.425]** 
Observations  12085  12122  12085  12085  12085  12122  12085 
R-squared  0.09  0.52  0.52  .40  0.02  0.12  0.13 
 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
                                                 
10 We also run several panel regressions employing within (or fixed effects), between and random effects 
specifications.  The coefficients of the interaction terms, (interface * year 1996) and (interface * year 
1998), are both positive in these regressions. However, their p-values are around 0.2.    32 
Table 5 
 
Regression analysis of the impact of the change of patenting behaviors on firms’ financial 
performance.  The sample consists of biannual observations of 15,207 software firms between 
1992 and 1998. We present the results in three panels, using various dependent variables. The 
first row of each table indicates the performance measures we use as dependent variables. For 
each measure, we first run the regressions without using the predicted number of patents. This 
examines  whether  firms  in  sectors  with  more  generous  patent  policies  grow  more  rapidly, 
regardless  of  their  specific  patenting  activity.  Then  we  add  the  lagged  predicted  number  of 
patents  and  its  interaction  with  interface  and  year  dummies  to  examine  to  what  extent  the 
difference  in  their  patenting  activity  affects  their  performance.  All  regressions  employ  an 
ordinary least squares specification except in the case of the inception of venture financing where 








-0.593  0.071  -13.864  -25.743 
Year 1994 
[1.166]  [1.002]  [16.368]  [30.151] 
7.714  5.334  -0.973  -2.932 
Year 1996 
[2.065]***  [1.756]***  [27.365]  [54.078] 
-0.754  -0.470  -5.007  -10.347 
Year 1998 
[2.071]  [1.732]  [22.638]  [44.855] 
-0.126  0.462  14.912  26.857 
interface 
[1.196]  [1.073]  [14.561]  [29.682] 
-7.685  -6.920  -14.316  -25.072 
interface * year1996 
[2.389]***  [2.251]***  [31.550]  [60.372] 
1.598  -24.090  -11.683  -22.735 
interface * year1998 
[2.413]  [2.905]***  [26.533]  [53.224] 
0.103  0.105  0.175  0.540 
Age of the firm 
[0.044]**  [0.039]***  [0.293]  [0.684] 
1.813  -7.882  -28.524  -63.675 
Entry rate 
[4.496]  [4.096]*  [51.740]  [105.794] 
  0.000    0.000  Lagged predicted number 
of patents    [0.000]    [0.000] 
  12.274    -0.004  interface * year1996 * 
lagged predicted number of 
patents    [5.032]**    [0.075] 
  36.551    0.852  interface * year1998 * 
lagged predicted number of 
patents    [2.953]***    [15.865] 
    -0.058  -0.078 
Lagged total asset 
    [0.185]  [0.381] 
-0.119  -0.119     
Lagged value of sales 
[0.234]  [0.174]     
Observations  12473  7108  2372  1262 
R-squared  0.00  0.03  0.00  0.01   33 
Panel B 
 














-1.116  -1.627  0.075  0.036  -0.488  0.312 
Year 1994 
[0.967]  [1.686]  [0.407]  [0.242]  [1.033]  [0.162]* 
-0.761  -1.926  0.030  -0.136  2.325  0.380 
Year 1996 
[1.617]  [3.058]  [0.652]  [0.389]  [1.754]  [0.272] 
-1.701  -3.397  1.655  0.153  0.115  0.230 
Year 1998 
[1.300]  [2.449]  [0.597]***  [0.357]  [1.619]  [0.252] 
-0.632  -1.880  0.154  0.203  0.842  0.096 
interface 
[0.842]  [1.608]  [0.415]  [0.258]  [0.993]  [0.162] 
1.534  2.564  0.198  -1.427  -3.133  -0.225 
interface * year1996 
[1.866]  [3.408]  [0.751]  [0.496]***  [2.023]  [0.350] 
1.870  -1.317  -1.478  -1.203  -0.540  -0.531 
interface * year1998 
[1.524]  [2.900]  [0.683]**  [0.709]*  [1.886]  [0.528] 
-0.011  -0.038  -0.005  -0.011  -0.037  -0.004 
Age of the firm 
[0.016]  [0.036]  [0.015]  [0.008]  [0.036]  [0.006] 
-1.882  -5.880  -1.365  0.187  1.405  (dropped) 
Entry rate 
[3.003]  [5.654]  [1.467]  [0.924]  [3.753]   
  0.000    0.030    0.000  Lagged predicted 
number of patents    [0.000]    [0.039]    [0.000] 
  0.001    7.587    0.651  interface * year1996 
* lagged predicted 
number of patents    [0.004]    [1.085]***    [0.762] 
  5.580    1.846    1.377  interface * year1998 
* lagged predicted 
number of patents    [0.836]***    [0.826]**    [0.623]** 
        -0.030  -0.012  Lagged sales per 
employee          [0.145]  [0.017] 
    0.000  0.000      Lagged number of 
employees      [0.000]***  [0.000]***     
-0.009  -0.034         
Lagged market cap 
[0.010]  [0.018]*         
Observations  2080  1124  11031  6653  9341  5530 
R-squared  0.00  0.04  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.01   34 
Panel C 
 
















-0.169  0.162  -0.038  0.016  0.091  0.347 
Year 1994 
[0.112]  [0.108]  [0.018]**  [0.026]  [0.102]  [0.191]* 
-0.028  0.003  -0.014  0.018  0.102  0.372 
Year 1996 
[0.166]  [0.182]  [0.029]  [0.044]  [0.146]  [0.268] 
-0.267  -0.177  -0.020  0.019  0.368  0.544 
Year 1998 
[0.146]*  [0.161]  [0.026]  [0.039]  [0.124]***  [0.274]** 
-0.066  -0.141  0.396  0.372  0.014  -0.056 
interface 
[0.092]  [0.104]  [0.018]***  [0.028]***  [0.096]  [0.206] 
0.182  0.433  0.025  -0.003  0.041  -0.040 
interface * year1996 
[0.197]  [0.206]**  [0.035]  [0.050]  [0.175]  [0.296] 
0.091  0.258  -0.028  -0.024  0.060  0.189 
interface * year1998 
[0.172]  [0.191]  [0.031]  [0.054]  [0.145]  [0.335] 
-0.009  -0.006  0.002  0.002  -0.028  -0.012 
Age of the firm 
[0.002]***  [0.003]**  [0.001]***  [0.001]**  [0.005]***  [0.008] 
0.244  -0.298  0.065  0.207  0.434  2.064 
Entry rate 
[0.311]  [0.387]  [0.063]  [0.100]**  [0.258]*  [0.577]*** 
  0.000    0.000    0.000  Lagged predicted 
number of patents    [0.000]    [0.000]**    [0.000] 
  0.000    0.003    0.000  interface * year1996 
* lagged predicted 
number of patents    [0.000]    [0.000]***    [0.010] 
  -0.009    0.017    -0.006  interface * year1998 
* lagged predicted 
number of patents    [0.052]    [0.041]    [0.249] 
    -0.049  -0.045      Lagged number of 
product lines      [0.002]***  [0.002]***     
0.000  0.000         
Lagged R&D 
[0.000]***  [0.000]*         
Observations  2580  1032  25707  12245  31792  11439 
R-squared  0.02  0.03  0.05  0.07  0.04  0.05 
 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   35 
Table 6 
 
Robustness  checks  using  other  definitions  for  interface  firms.    The  sample  consists  of 
biannual observations of 15,207 software firms between 1992 and 1998. As a robustness check, 
we use different event windows and relative or absolute returns for identifying affected firms. 
Then we repeat the regressions in Table 4 using these new definitions and report results here.  In 
all cases, results from the Poisson specification are reported. Heteroskedastic-adjusted standard 
errors in parentheses.  
 
We report the regression results based on the following three interface definitions: 
  
A.  We use (t-2, t+2) as the event window and use the absolute return as the dependent variable 
for identifying affected firms. Here we only consider firms whose technology class(es) 
belong to the strongly affected class as the interface firms.  
 
B.  We use (t-2, t+2) as the event window and use the relative return as the dependent variable 
for identifying affected firms. Here we consider firms whose technology class(es) belong to 
the strong or median class as the interface firms.  
 
C.  We use (t-3, t+3) as the event window and use the absolute return as the dependent variable 
for identifying affected firms. Here we consider firms whose technology class(es) belong to 
the strong or median class as the interface firms.  
 
 
Regression ID  A  B  C 
-0.206  -0.020  -0.131  interface 
[0.042]***  [0.042]  [0.037]*** 
1.942  3.179  1.849  Interface * year1996 
[0.063]***  [0.142]***  [0.082]*** 
1.553  0.971  1.392  Interface * year1998 
[0.052]***  [0.059]***  [0.058]*** 
-1.519  -1.552  -1.505  Year 1994 
[0.040]***  [0.041]***  [0.041]*** 
-1.642  -3.651  -2.343  Year 1996 
[0.041]***  [0.139]***  [0.076]*** 
-0.619  -0.790  -1.104  Year 1998 
[0.032]***  [0.056]***  [0.054]*** 
0.003  0.005  0.005  Age of the firm 
[0.001]***  [0.001]***  [0.001]*** 
0.000  0.000  0.000  Lagged value of sales 
[0.000]***  [0.000]***  [0.000]*** 
0.002  0.002  0.002  Lagged total number of patents 
applied  [0.000]***  [0.000]***  [0.000]*** 
1.189  1.734  1.802  Entry rate 
[0.105]***  [0.105]***  [0.103]*** 
Observations  12085  12085  12085 
R-squared  .53  .52  .52 
 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%    
 